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In the development of large distributed systems, both the detection and resolution 
of inconsistency in policy, requirements, and specifications pose major challenges. The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the inconsistencies in policy, requirements, and 
specifications in the development of informatiodJoint Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems. In this thesis, we explore 
the application of a “viewpoints” framework to aid in the development of dstributed 
information systems. 
A viewpoints framework methodology that was developed to aid in the 
development of distributed systems is the Reference Model of Open Distributed 
Processing (RM-ODP). This thesis is concerned with the application of the five 
viewpoints of RM-ODP and the translation of policy into requirements and specifications. 
In this thesis we use the Ballistic mssile Defense (BMD) system as a case study to 
explain how RM-ODP can be used to develop distributed information systems. We 
found that identifying inconsistencies regarding interoperability amongst the subsystems 
of BMD necessitated the use of multiple viewpoints and that firm conclusions could not 
be made until the system was viewed at the lower levels. 
V 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the development of large distributed information systems, both the detection 
and resolution of inconsistency in policy, requirements, and specifications pose major 
challenges. The purpose of this thesis is to examine inconsistencies in policy, 
requirements, and specifications in the development of distributed informatiodJoint 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems. In this 
thesis, we explore the application of a “viewpoints” framework to aid in the development 
of distributed information systems. 
A viewpoints framework methodology that was developed to aid in the 
development of distributed systems is the Reference Model of Open Distributed 
Processing (RM-ODP). This thesis is concerned with the application of the five 
viewpoints of RM-ODP and the translation of policy into requirements and specifications. 
A case study of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system is presented in order to 
illustrate how RM-ODP can be used in the definition of requirements and specifications 
and in the detection of inconsistencies in policy, requirements, and specifications. The 
BMD system is a good candidate to model using viewpoints because it is a complex, 
distributed, heterogeneous system comprised of many subsystems. 
Ballistic missile defense involves many challenges. One of these challenges is the 
ability to hit a moving target. Another major challenge facing BMD is that of 
interoperability amongst all the systems. The RM-ODP viewpoints can be used to aid in 
modeling the BMD system to help address some of these challenges. Through the use of 
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RM-ODP, the various members of the development team can communicate their policy, 
requiements, and specifications for the composite system using a common set of 
languages and mappings between the languages (i.e, levels in the five-layer viewpoint 
model). 
In the case study the interoperability problem facing the BMD system is addressed 
The case study demonstrates how the using the RM-ODP viewpoints framework. 
viewpoints can be applied at a very abstract level. 
Much research has been done in the area of viewpoints. The concepts of 
viewpoints and inconsistency management in software development are introduced. 
Much of the previous research stresses the importance of conflicts in software 
development and suggests that conflicts are a necessary part of the development process 
and should be represented and understood. The use of a policy workbench to aid in 
analyzing proposed policy, maintaining a policy database, and assisting in policy 
enforcement is also discussed. Lastly, policy conflicts and the problems of conflict 
detection and resolution in distributed systems are presented. 
We found that identifying inconsistencies regarding interoperability amongst the 
subsystems of BMD necessitated the use of multiple viewpoints and that firm conclusions 
could not be made until the system was viewed at the lower levels. These finlngs can be 
used by U.S. DoD as a tool to aid in the development of distributed information systems. 
X 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Many questions remain to be answered regarding how to best develop large 
distributed systems. Among other things, both the detection and resolution of 
inconsistencies in policy, requirements, and specifications pose major challenges. 
A distributed system is a set of computers, connected by at least one network, that 
do not share memory or a common clock. The goal of a distributed system is to cause a 
set of computers to appear to the user as a single, powerful virtual machine. There are 
five primary advantages offered by distributed systems: resource sharing (hardware and 
software can be shared among computers); enhanced performance (higher throughput and 
speed through increased concurrency); improved reliability (through replication of data 
files and services, distributed systems can be made more fault tolerant); improved 
availability (some components may fail without affecting the overall availability of the 
system); and modular expandability (hardware and software can be added without 
adversely impacting existing resources). 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the inconsistencies in policy (rules or a 
means of specifying and influencing behavior within a distributed system), requirements, 
and specifications in the development of distributed informatiodJoint Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems. In this thesis, we 
explore the application of a “viewpoints” framework to aid in the development of 
distributed information systems. A viewpoints framework is used to partition a system 
specification into a number of different components. Each component (viewpoint) is a 
complete and self-contained description of the required distributed system targeted 
towards a particular audience (development team participant). 
B. MOTIVATION 
One viewpoints framework methodology that was developed to aid in the 
development of distributed systems is the Reference Model of Open Distributed 
Processing (RM-ODP). RM-ODP allows developers to view the system as an interrelated 
whole rather than as a collection of parts, and provides a way in which distributed 
systems and their features can be described. Much work has been done with the RM- 
ODP approach to systems development. This thesis is concerned with the application of 
the five viewpoints of RM-ODP and the translation of policy into requirements and 
specifications. This thesis will use the Ballistic Missile Defense system (which is a large 
distributed system) as a case study to explain how RM-ODP can be used in the definition 
of requirements and specifications and in the detection of inconsistencies in policy, 
requirements, and specifications. 
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is limited to application of the five viewpoints of RM- 
ODP to managing inconsistency when developing distributed information systems, in 
particular the Ballistic Missile Defense system. This research will provide conclusions 
and recommendations for dealing with inconsistencies in the definition of policy, 
2 
requirements, and specifications for information systems/Joint C41 systems. The 
resulting conclusions and recommendations in this research are intended to aid the U.S. 
Department of Defense @OD) in the development of systems so that inconsistencies are 
caught as early in the life cycle as possible. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter II provides an overview of 
RM-ODP and discusses the five viewpoints in detail. Chapter III describes some of the 
previous research most closely related to this thesis. The concepts of viewpoints and 
inconsistency management in software development are introduced. Much of the 
previous research stresses the importance of conflicts in software development and 
suggests that conflicts are a necessary part of the development process and should be 
represented and understood. The use of a policy workbench to aid in analyzing proposed 
policy, maintain a policy database, and assist in policy enforcement is also discussed. 
Lastly, policy conflicts and the problems of conflict detection and resolution in 
distributed systems are presented. Chapter IV provides an overview of the BMD 
system. Chapter V uses the BMD system as case study to demonstrate how RM-ODP can 
be used to aid in the definition of requirements and specifications. Chapter VI provides 
the resulting conclusions and recdmmendations in this research. Suggestions for future 
research are also discussed. 
3 




Advances in computer networking have allowed computer systems across the 
world to be interconnected. Despite this, heterogeneity of computer systems is still a 
problem. Open Distributed Processing (ODP) describes systems that support 
heterogeneous distributed processing both within and between organizations through the 
use of a common interactive model. The International Standards Organization (ISO) and 
the International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunications Standardization 
Sector (ITU-T) have developed the Reference Model of Open Distributed Processing 
(RM-ODP) to provide a coordinating framework for the standardization of ODP by 
creating an architecture, which supports distributing, internetworkmg, interoperability, 
and portability. RM-ODP is a standardized framework for modeling such systems. 
[HERR971 The goal of RM-ODP is to achieve the following: 
Portability of application across heterogeneous systems 
Interlocking between ODP systems; that is, meaningful exchange of information 
and the convenient use of functionality throughout the distributed system 
Distribution transparency; that is, hide the consequences of distribution from both 
the applications programmer and user [ENTE99] 
The following distribution transparencies defined in RM-ODP [ISO395]: 
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Access transparency - hides the differences in data representation and procedure 
calling mechanism to enable intenvorking between heterogeneous computer 
systems 
Failure transparency - masks the failure and possible recovery of objects, to 
enhance fault tolerance 
Location transparency - masks the use of physical addresses, including the 
distinction between local and remote 
Migration transparency - masks the relocation of an object and its interfaces from 
other objects and interfaces bound to it 
Relocation transparency - hides the relocation of an object and its interfaces from 
other objects and interfaces bound to it 
Replication transparency - maintains consistency of a group of replicated objects 
with a common interface and is used to enhance performance and availability 
Persistence transparency - masks the deactivation and reactivation of an object 
Transaction transparency - hides the coordination required to satisfy the 
transactional properties of operations 
The reference model provides the “big picture” that organizes the pieces of an 
ODP system into a coherent whole. It does not try to standardize the components of the 
system or unnecessarily influence the choice of technology. 
The RM-ODP architecture uses the notion of viewpoints as an abstraction 
mechanism. The viewpoints on an ODP system and its environment are as follows: 
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Enterprise viewpoint (purpose, scope, and policies) 
Information viewpoint (semantics of information and information processing) 
Computational viewpoint (functional decomposition) 
Engineering viewpoint (infrastructure required to support bstribution) 
Technology viewpoint (choices of technology for implementation) [FEUS99] 
Specifying an ODP system using the viewpoint languages allows for an otherwise 
large and complex specification of an ODP system to be separated into manageable 
pieces, each focused on the issues relevant to a member of the development team. For 
example, the systems analyst works with the information specification while the systems 
programmer is concerned with the engineering viewpoint. Figure 1 shows how the RM- 
ODP viewpoints can be related to the software engineering process of requirements 
analysis, functional specification, design, and implementation. 
Enterprise Requirements Analysis 
.... ............................ ......... .-- ........... I .... _..I_--- ............ 
, t i  "4, 
Information I Computational Functional Specification 
................ \ "L\ ..... "-b ....... / -/ ........... 
Design 
............................................ ".nu..*.. .... ".....I ................................................ Yr/ Technology Implementation 
Figure 1. RM-ODP Viewpoints and Software Engineering 
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The five viewpoints are discussed in the following sections. 
B. ENTERPRISE VIEWPOINT 
The enterprise viewpoint focuses on the purpose, scope, and policies for the 
system. In the enterprise viewpoint, social and organizational policies can be defined in 
terms of objects, communities, and roles of the objects within the communities. 
1. Objects 
Objects are classified as either “active” or “passive.” Some examples of active 
objects are bank managers, tellers, and customers. Examples of passive objects are bank 
accounts and money. [IS03951 
2. Communities 
Communities are groupings of objects intended to achieve some purpose. An 
example of a community is a bank branch. The bank branch consists of objects (bank 
manager, tellers, and bank accounts), which provide banking services to a geographical 
area (purpose). [IS03951 
3. Roles of Objects 
Roles of the objects within the communities are expressed in terms of policies. 
Policies dictate the behavior of objects within a community. Policies have varying scope. 
They may apply across a community, to a role, or to a single action type. Policies can be 
either implicit or explicit. Implicit policies are derived from the specification of a role, 
enterprise object, or action. An explicit policy is one for which policy is specified in its 
own right. [IS03951 
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Policies consist of three components: 1) Permissions, 2) Prohibitions, and 3) 
Obligations. Permissions describe what can be done; for example, money can be 
deposited in an open bank account. Prohibitions describe what must not be done; for 
example, customers must not withdraw more money than they have in their bank account. 
Obligations describe what must be done; for example, the bank manager must advise 
customers when the interest rate changes. Permissions and prohibitions are defined by 
actions, roles involved in that action, predicates on behavior, and an authority, which 
either grants the permission or imposes the prohibition. [MICH99] 
4. Enterprise Language 
The enterprise language is a structured set of concepts, rules, and structures for the 
specification of an ODP system using the enterprise viewpoint. It is specifically 
concerned with performance actions that change policy, such as creating an obligation or 
revoking permission. In a bank, the changing of interest rates is a performance action 
since it creates obligations on the bank manager to inform customers of the change. 
However, obtaining an account balance is not a performance action because obligations, 
permissions, and prohibitions are not affected. [IS01951 
By imposing an enterprise specification of an ODP application, policies are 
determined by the organization rather than imposed on the organization by technology 
(implementation) choices. For example, a customer should not be limited to having only 
one bank account because it is more convenient for the programmer to implement. 
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C. INFORMATION VIEWPOINT 
The information viewpoint focuses on the semantics of information and 
information processing. The information viewpoint is used to describe the information 
required by an ODP application through the use of schemas, which describe the state and 
structure of an object. An example of an information viewpoint is the information about 
a bank account object, which consists of a schema containing the balance and the 
“amount withdrawn today.” [IS03951 
A static schema captures the state and structure of an object at some particular 
instance; for example, at midnight, the amount withdrawn today is $0. An invariant 
schema restricts the state and structure of an object at all times; for example, the amount 
withdrawn today is less than or equal to $500. A dynamic schema defines a permitted 
change in the state and structure of an object; for example, a withdrawal of $n from an 
account decreases the balance by $n and increases the amount withdrawn today by $n. 
Dynamic schemas are constrained by any existing and applicable invariant schemas. 
[IS03951 
Schemas can also be used to describe relationships or associations between 
objects; for example, the static schema “owns account” could associate each account with 
a customer. A schema can be composed from other schemas to describe complex or 
composite objects; for example, a bank branch consists of a set of customers, a set of 
accounts, and the “owns account” relationships. The information specification of an ODP 
application can be expressed using a variety of methods; for example, entity-relationship 
models and conceptual schemas. [IS03951 
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D. COMPUTATIONAL VIEWPOINT 
The computational viewpoint focuses on the functional decomposition of the 
system into objects, which interact at interfaces. The computational viewpoint is used to 
specify the functionality of an ODP application in a dstribution-transparent manner. 
RM-ODP’s computational viewpoint is object-based. The objects encapsulate data and 
methods, offer interfaces for interaction with other objects, and offer multiple interfaces. 
[IS03951 
The computational viewpoint further defines the objects within an ODP system, 
the activities within those objects, and the interactions that occur among objects. Most 
objects in a computational viewpoint describe application functionality, and these objects 
are linked by bindings (e.g. a communication path) through which interfaces occur. 
Binding objects are used to describe complex interactions between objects. [IS01951 
Figure 2 illustrates a bank branch object providing a bank teller interface and a bank 
manager interface. Both interfaces can be used to deposit and withdraw money, but 
accounts can be created only through the bank manager interface. Each of the bank 
branch object’s interfaces is bound to a customer object. 
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Bank Branch 
Bank Teller Interface Object 
Customer 
Object 1 h 1 / (Ucustomerhfo 




1 Create account 
Bank Manager 
account .I 
Figure 2. Bank Branch Object with Bank Manager and Bank Teller Interfaces 
E. ENGINEERING VIEWPOINT 
The engineering viewpoint focuses on the infrastructure required to support 
distributed interaction between objects in the system. The engineering viewpoint is not 
concerned with semantics of the ODP application, except to determine its requirements 
for lstribution and distribution transparency. [IS0 1951 The computational viewpoint is 
concerned with when and why objects interact, while the engineering viewpoint is 
concerned with how they interact. 
The fundamental entities described in the engineering viewpoint are objects and 
channels. Objects in the engineering viewpoint can be divided into two categories - basic 
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engineering objects and infrastructure objects. Basic engineering objects correspond to 
the objects in the computational viewpoint. An example of an infrastructure object is a 
protocol object. A channel corresponds to a binding or binding object in the 
computational viewpoint. A channel provides the communication mechanism and 
contains or controls the distribution transparencies. [IS03951 
F. TECHNOLOGY VIEWPOINT 
The technology viewpoint focuses on the choice of technology for implementation 
of the system. The technology viewpoint also describes the information required for 
testing. RM-ODP has very few rules applicable to technology specifications. [IS03951 
13 
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111. RELATED WORK 
This chapter describes some of the previous research most closely related to this 
thesis. The work of seven groups of authors is highlighted in the remainder of this 
section. A separate section for each group follows. 
Finkelstein and Fuks propose a formal framework for understanding the software 
development process and consider in particular software development as cooperative 
work. 
Nuseibeh, Kramer, and Finkelstein propose an object-based framework for the 
development of heterogeneous, composite systems. The framework uses viewpoints that 
represent agents having roles in and views of a problem domain. They also explore the 
use of inter-viewpoint rules to express the relationships between different viewpoints. 
Finkelstein, Gabbay, Hunter, and Nuseibeh discuss the distributed development of 
specifications from multiple perspectives. The authors combine two areas of research: 1) 
the viewpoints framework for perspective development, interaction, and organization and 
2) a logic-based approach to consistency handling. 
Easterbrook and Nuseibeh discuss inconsistency management. The authors use 
viewpoints to identify consistency relationships, check for inconsistencies, and resolve 
conflicts; these are important steps in managing inconsistency in an evolving 
specification. 
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Kotonya and Sommerville discuss several viewpoint-oriented requirements 
approaches and give a description of an alternative, object-oriented, viewpoint-based 
approach. 
Sibley, Michael, and Wexelblat  ISC CUSS the use of a policy workbench to aid in 
analyzing proposed policy, maintain a policy database, and assist in policy enforcement. 
The authors  ISC CUSS the requirements, preliminary design, and prototype implementation 
of such a workbench. 
Lupu and Sloman focus on policy conflicts and the problems of conflict detection 
and resolution in distributed systems. 
A. COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Finkelstein and Fuks propose a formal framework for understanding the software 
development process and consider, in particular, software development as cooperative 
work. The requirements for a software development framework are reviewed and set in 
the context of an established development paradigm. The underlying model of 
cooperation, based on dialogue, is motivated and outlined. A formal scheme for 
expressing this model is introduced and the basic constructs are described. The authors 
also present a tool to investigate software development in this style. m K 8 9 ]  
The authors argue that a framework is fundamental to organizing the development 
of software as an engineering activity. The authors’ discussion of a cooperative 
framework is divided into two parts. The first part outlines, from a software engineering 
perspective, the requirements and intuitions on which their approach is based. The 
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second part presents and illustrates the basic elements of a formal model of software 
development. They try to closely integrate the formal approach to software development 
with software engineering concerns such as cooperation. [FINK891 
The primary requirement for a model of software development is that it be 
cooperative. Additionally, the model should not fail in the presence of conflict. The 
resolution of conflicts should be explicitly controlled and organized as part of the overall 
process of software development. 
The authors’ starting point of a formal model is the established paradigm of 
incremental refinement. The model is based on dialogue. The underlying vehicle for 
defining the framework is a systematic model of dialogue. The model has the following 
components: 
1) View - a logical “perspective” in the dialogue in which a physical participant 
in a dialogue may have multiple views or “perspectives” that correspond with 
organizational roles 
2) Commitment store - each view has a commitment store which holds its 
commitments within its domain; e.g. the rules 
3) Board - the medium of communication between views which represents both 
a history of the dialogue and its current state 
4) Database - holds “facts” internally or privately to the view, stored before the 
start of the dialogue, and contains knowledge, which does not have the full 
status of public engagement 
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5 )  Dialogue engine - interprets the general rules governing the dialogue in the 
context of the current dialogue and acts as the controller of the dialogue, on 
the part of the view [FINK891 
The authors analyzed the model with a case study of an automated travel ticket 
system. The authors believe that dialogue provides a basis for cooperative software 
development framework, especially in the area of defining requirements. m K 8 9 ]  
B. THE VIEWPOINTS APPROACH 
Nuseibeh, Krarner, and Finkelstein discuss the problems of heterogeneity. They 
state that heterogeneity in large systems is inevitable and that no single development 
process or representation is sufficient for the development of large systems. 
Heterogeneity introduces problems of integration: 1) integration of the methods used to 
specify system requirements, 2) integration of the tools that support these methods, and 3) 
integration of the multiple specification fragments produced by these methods and tools. 
[NTJSE93] 
In the development of heterogeneous systems, the authors discuss a concept called 
the multiple perspectives problem, which they define as “the class of problems 
surrounding the development of composite systems by many development participants.” 
[NUSE93] The authors use an object-based viewpoints framework to deal with the 
problems of integration. They use viewpoints to describe the system development 
participants, their roles in the development process, and their views of the problem 
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domain. [NUSE93] Viewpoints encapsulate development of systems into five different 
slots: 
1) Style - notation or representation style used 
2) Domain - describes the area of concern of the viewpoint with respect to the 
overall system under development 
3) Work plan - development actions and strategy that use the notation defined in 
the style slot 
4) Specification - describes the viewpoint domain in the notation described in 
the style slot and developed using the strategy described in the work plan slot 
5) Work record - contains the development state and history of the specification 
produced in the specification slot and allows traceability 
The authors define a viewpoint template as a viewpoint type in which only the 
style and work plan slots have been defined. When instantiated, a viewpoint template 
becomes a viewpoint, which can then be expanded to produce the specification for a 
particular domain. A viewpoint template is therefore a reusable description of a 
development technique, which can be instantiated many times to produce dfferent 
viewpoints. 
The style slot of each template may be represented in terms of objects and 
relations, with each having attributes with types and values. The work'plan slot has four 
generic categories of development actions: 
1) Assembly actions - the basic actions required to build (assemble) a 
specification in the current representation style 
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2)  In-viewpoint check actions - actions that can be performed to check that a 
specification is syntactically consistent 
3) Inter-viewpoint check actions - actions that can be performed to check the 
consistency between (overlapping and interacting) specifications residmg in 
different viewpoints and may also be used to transfer information between 
viewpoint specifications 
4) Viewpoint trigger actions - actions that must be performed in order to create 
new viewpoints (instantiated viewpoint templates) 
The authors attempt to integrate multiple requirements specification viewpoints. 
In doing so, they state that overlaps must be identified and expressed, complementary 
participants must interact and cooperate, and contradictions must be resolved. The 
authors address Inter-viewpoint communication as a vehicle for viewpoint integration. 
The authors argue that “successful inter-viewpoint communication holds the key to 
achieving integration in a heterogeneous, possibly distributed, setting.” There is a need to 
express relationships between viewpoints, enact these relationships (check consistency 
and transfer or transform information), and resolve conflicts (if and when it is necessary 
to do so). [NUSE93] 
During development the different viewpoint specifications may be overlapping 
and/or inconsistent with each other. Inconsistency is tolerated in the viewpoints approach 
and not checked or corrected except as needed. Inter-viewpoint rules are then defined to 
check consistency and transfer and transform information between viewpoint 
specifications. The rules describe the relationships and specify when they may be 
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invoked and how they should be applied. The rules are defined in the viewpoint template 
work plans and describe relationships between viewpoints that have not yet been created. 
The authors define the rules in great detail. The inter-viewpoint rules are invoked by the 
owner (development participant) of the viewpoint in which they reside. The authors 
discuss three approaches to rules invocation: 
1) “The constrained” - in which rules are constantly invoked 
2) “Pragmatic” - in which rule invocation may be turned on and off by the user 
3) “Process-oriented” - in which the process model of the viewpoints guides 
rules invocation [NUSE94] 
The authors state that “ideally, a method designer would be provided with a 
predefined library of relationships at hisher disposal, with the option of defining any 
further relationships if required.” [NUSE94] There are two modes of application of an 
inter-viewpoint rule: 
1) Check Mode - in which the relationship question is asked (does the 
relationship hold between the two viewpoints?). The relationship either holds 
or conflict resolution must be performed to make it hold. 
2) Transfer Mode - in which the function is applied to transfer and transform 
information from one viewpoint to another so that the relation will hold 
between them. [NUSE94] 
An invoked inter-viewpoint rule is normally applied in “check mode” to begin 
with, after which a “transfer mode” may be entered into if the rule failed. Information 
transfer is viewed as a form of conflict resolution. 
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The authors use a generic computer-based prototype environment called The 
Viewer to support the viewpoints framework. The Viewer provides tools for viewpoint 
construction and deployment. [NUSE92] 
C. INCONSISTENCY HANDLING 
Finkelstein, Gabbay, Hunter, and Nuseibeh discuss the distributed development of 
specifications from multiple perspectives. Using multiple perspectives leads to problems 
of identifying and handling inconsistencies between perspectives. The authors combine 
two areas of research: 1) the viewpoints framework for perspective development, 
interaction, and organization and 2)  a logic-based approach to consistency handling. 
[FINK941 
The authors do not believe that it is possible to maintain absolute consistency 
between perspectives at all times. It is often undesirable to enforce consistency, 
“particularly when this constrains the specification unnecessarily or entails loss of design 
freedom by enforcing an early resolution.” [m”K94] 
The authors provide an overview of inconsistency handling using the viewpoints 
framework. The authors also illustrate and discuss the identification and handling of 
inconsistency using simple library system example. They believe that inconsistency 
handling should be based on logic. They state that “the problem of inconsistency 
handling in the viewpoints framework can then be viewed as being equivalent to 
inconsistency handling in distributed logical databases.” [FINK941 
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D. INCONSISTENCY MANAGEMENT WITH VIEWPOINTS 
Easterbrook and Nuseibeh discuss inconsistency management. The authors state 
that “inconsistency is important in the software specification process, because, on the one 
hand, inconsistent specifications cannot be satisfied, whereas on the other, it is hard to 
achieve consistency in a large specification written by a team.” EAST961 They believe 
that proper management of inconsistencies lead to a more robust specification, because 
inconsistencies provide important clues about missing information. They show that 
viewpoints can be used as the cornerstone of effective inconsistency management. 
[EAST961 
They define inconsistency to be “any situation in which two parts of a 
specification do not obey some relationship that should hold between them.” [EAST961 
Inconsistency classification focuses on identifying the lund of inconsistency that has been 
detected in a specification. Inconsistencies are classified in two ways: 1) according to 
cause, the result of mistakes such as typographic error or conceptual disagreements and 2) 
into different predefined kinds of inconsistency that may arise in programming. 
The authors define five ways of dealing with inconsistencies: 
1) Ignore - appropriate if inconsistency is isolated and does not prevent further 
development, or the level of risk does not justify fixing it 
2) Delay - used when further information is required, but is not immediately 
available 
3) Circumvent - used to disable or modify the rule that was broken to get around 
the inconsistency 
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4) Ameliorate - appropriate when steps are needed to improve the situation but 
not necessarily remove the inconsistency, also called incremental resolution 
5) Resolve - used to repair the inconsistency immediately [EAST961 
An inconsistency implies missing information. Inconsistency management 
provides a route to improved understanding of requirements. A key problem is tracking 
known inconsistencies and recording development information. 
They base their work on a framework for distributed software engineering, in 
which multiple perspectives are maintained separately as distributable objects called 
viewpoints, which are defined in [NUSE92], [NUSE93], and [NUSE94]. The framework 
is independent of any software development method. 
In the authors’ framework, there is no requirement for changes to one viewpoint 
to be consistent with other viewpoints. EAST961 Inconsistencies are tolerated 
throughout the software development process. They focus on the management of 
inconsistencies. Consistency checking and resolution are still required, but they are 
delayed until an appropriate time. To manage inconsistencies, the relationships between 
viewpoints are clearly defined. Consistency checking is performed by applying a set of 
rules which express the relationships; these rules should hold between particular 
viewpoints. 
The authors’ use state transition diagrams to specify the required behavior of a 
device. The method permits partitioning of the state transition diagram describing a 
single device into separate viewpoints, such that the union of all of the viewpoints 
describes all of the states and transitions of the device. [EAST961 
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The method provides the following: 
1) The notation for expressing states and transitions diagrammatically 
2) A partitioning step that allows a separate diagram to be created to represent a 
subset of the behaviors of a particular device 
3) A set of consistency checking rules which test whether partitioned diagrams 
representing the same device are mutually consistent 
4) An analysis step that allows two viewpoints to be treated as separate devices 
that interact 
5) A further set of consistency checking rules which test whether interacting 
devices whose transitions have been linked together exhibit consistent 
behaviors 
The authors also discuss The Viewer, a prototype computer-based environment 
and associated tools (discussed in Nuseibeh, Gamer, and Finkelstein’s work), which has 
been constructed to support the viewpoints framework. The Viewer has two distinct 
modes of use: method design and method use. Method design involves creation of 
viewpoint templates; these are viewpoints for which only the representation style and a 
work plan slots are defined. In method use, viewpoints are instantiated from the 
templates to represent the various perspectives. Each viewpoint is a self-contained 
specification development tool. The Consistency Check in The Viewer allows users to 
invoke and apply in- and inter-viewpoint consistency rules and record the results of all the 
checks in the work record of the affected viewpoint. [EAST961 
25 
The authors state that viewpoints facilitate separation of concerns and the 
partitioning of software development knowledge. FAST961 Partitioning is only useful if 
relationships and dependencies between partitions can be defined. The authors showed 
how relationships could be defined as part of a collection of viewpoints. They also 
demonstrated how inconsistencies identified by chechng relationships could be resolved. 
According to the authors, identifying consistency relationships, checking inconsistency 
and resolving conflicts are all important steps in managing inconsistency in an evolving 
specification. [EAST961 
E. OB JECT-ORIENTED VIEWPOINT-BASED APPROACH 
Kotonya and Sommerville discuss several viewpoint-oriented requirements 
approaches and give a description of an alternative object-oriented viewpoint-based 
approach. They use an automated teller machine (ATM) case study to analyze the various 
approaches. 
The authors state that the “task of modeling a user’s needs involves the capture, 
analysis and resolution of many ideas, perspectives and relationships at varying levels of 
detail.” [KOT092] The authors have developed a two-layered approach to system 
modeling. The first layer, the viewpoint layer, is concerned with “identifying relevant 
viewpoint entities in the system environment and associating them with the services they 
require.” The second layer, the system layer, is concerned with “identifying system 
entities responsible for the provision of services to the viewpoint layer.” In their research, 
the authors only discuss the viewpoint layer. [KOT092] 
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The authors discuss and analyze six viewpoint-oriented approaches developed by 
other researchers, which include: 
1) Structured Requirements Definition (SRD) 
2)  Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) 
3) Controlled Requirements Expression (CORE) 
4) Viewpoints-Oriented Software Development (VOSD) 
5) Viewpoint Analysis 
6 )  Other Methods 
1. Structured Requirements Definition (SRD) 
SRD is based on “defining the application context.” [KOT092] It consists of a 
four-step process: 
1) Define a user-level data-flow diagram by interviewing each individual in the 
organization to be analyzed who currently performs some useful task. Record 
the input/output as a data-flow model. 
2) Combine all like user-level data-flow diagrams to create one integrated data- 
flow diagram. Conflicting data can be resolved at this stage. 
3) Define the application-level data-flow diagram by drawing a dotted line 
around the part of the combined user data-flow dtagram that corresponds to 
the organization being analyzed. 
4) Define the application-level functions by showing the order that comprises 
each function being performed by the organization being modeled. 
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SRD viewpoints are individuals in the organization being specified that are 
manually performing a function which will be automated. SRD does not work well if the 
system being specified does not involve the automation of several manual tasks. 
Kotonya and Sommerville list the shortcomings of the SRD approach. They state 
that SRD has an intuitive, rather than defined, notion of a viewpoint, malung it the 
secondary rather than primary technique used in the methodology. The authors also state 
that “viewpoint analysis does not extend beyond data sourcing and sinking in SRD.” 
[KOT092] 
2. 
SADT is based on a data-flow model that views a system as a set of activities. “A 
rectangular box representing the system’s most abstract activity, together with a set of 
data input, data output and control arrows, forms the starting point for functional 
decomposition.” [KOT092] Consistency checking involves “matching the set of inputs 
and outputs at each successive functional level with the higher function.” [KOT092] 
Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) 
The authors also discuss the shortcoming of SADT. Like SDR, the SADT 
viewpoint is not defined; it is an intuitive extension of the underlying modeling 
technique. SADT viewpoints are also not analyzed beyond being seen as data sources 
and sinks. SADT does not provide a framework for control information between 
viewpoints. 
3. Controlled Requirements Expression (CORE) 
CORE is a functional requirements definition method based on a viewpoint 
approach. It is one of the few requirements definition methods that explicitly uses a 
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viewpoint approach. CORE defines viewpoints at two levels. The first level consists of 
all entities that interact or affect the system in some way. The second level is concerned 
with distinguishing between defining and bounding viewpoints. “Bounding viewpoints 
are entities that interact indirectly with the system, whereas defining viewpoints are sub- 
processes of the system, viewed in a top-down manner.” [KOT092] 
The CORE methodology consists of steps: 1) viewpoint identification, 2) 
viewpoint structuring, 3) tabular collection, 4) data structuring, 5 )  single viewpoint 
modeling, 6) combined viewpoint modeling, and 7) constraints analysis. 
In step 1, the viewpoint identification step, functional and non-functional 
viewpoints are identified. Step 2, the viewpoint structuring step, provides a framework 
for requirements capture and analysis. It involves iterative decomposition of the system 
into a hierarchy of functional sub-systems, using a top-down decomposition. Step 3, the 
tabular collection step, is a mechanism for gathering information about a viewpoint. 
Each viewpoint is considered with respect to the following: 1) the action it performs, 2) 
the input data used for these actions, 3) the output data derived, 4) the sources of the data, 
and 5 )  the destinations of the data. Tabular collections are required to resolve omissions 
and conflicts in information across viewpoints. Steps 4 through 7 are not discussed in 
detail in the authors’ work. 
Kotonya and Sommerville state that the major weakness in CORE is its poorly 
defined notion of a viewpoint. Since the CORE viewpoint can be any entity that interacts 
with the system, it is difficult to say what is and is not a valid viewpoint. 
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4. Viewpoints-Oriented Software Development (VOSD) 
In viewpoints-oriented software development (VOSD), Finkelstein proposed the 
use of viewpoints as a way of managing the software development process. VOSD uses 
viewpoints to “capture the role and responsibility performed by a participant at a 
particular stage of the software development process. Viewpoints are identified by the 
role of the participant, the domain relevant to their interest and the knowledge about the 
domain.” [KOT092] A viewpoint is a combination of a style or representation scheme in 
which the viewpoint expresses what it sees, the domain it sees, a specification, a work 
plan that defines the conditions under which the specification can be changed, and a work 
record. A template is defined as a viewpoint with only the style and work plan. 
[KOT092] Viewpoints are discussed in greater detail in section B of this chapter. 
VOSD is both a “requirements approach and an approach to facilitate distributed 
software development.” [KOT092] According to Kotonya and Sommerville, VOSD 
fails to provide a firm framework for resolving the conflicts between representations that 
have little correspondence. They also state that VOSD provides no obvious way of 
integrating functional and non-functional requirements and capturing the different classes 
of entities. 
5. Viewpoint Analysis 
k i t e  uses a viewpoints resolution approach as a means for early validation in the 
process of requirements elicitation. [KOT092 J The objective is to identify and classify 
problems related to correctness and completeness. k i t e  defines a viewpoint as “standing 
or mental position used by an individual when examining a universe of discourse (the 
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overall context in which the software will be developed, including all the sources of 
information and the people involved).” [KOT092] A perspective is defined as “a set of 
facts observed and modeled according to a particular aspect of reality.” [KOT092] 
Viewpoint analysis uses three modeling aspects: the data perspective, the actor 
perspective, and the process perspective. A view is defined as an integration of these 
perspectives. View integration is achieved by a view-construction process. [KOT092] 
k i t e  uses a viewpoint language (VWPL) to represent the viewpoints. Kotonya 
and Sommerville state that k i t e  associates viewpoints with the roles of the people in 
analyzing the problem domain. They also state that VWPL is not a requirements 
language and that “its main objective is to register early results of the fact elicitation 
process in the requirements exercise.” [KOT092] 
6. Other Methods 
Kotonya and Sommerville also discuss two other approaches to requirements 
definition. Van Lamsweerde, Fickas, and Dardenne use a goal-directed approach to 
resolve conflicts and develop multiple viewpoints. Dubios, Hagelstein, and Rifuat 
developed an approach that focuses on the larger system formed by the computer and its 
environment, rather than on the required system software. [KOT092] 
Kotonya and Sommerville do not view Van Lamsweerde, Fickas, and Dardenne’s 
approach or Dubios, Hagelstein, and Rifuat’s approach as viewpoint oriented and, 
therefore, do not discuss them in detail. 
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7. Viewpoint-oriented Analysis (VOA) 
Kotonya and Sommerville d~scuss their approach, which is an object-oriented 
viewpoint-based approach to requirements definition called viewpoint-oriented analysis 
(VOA). “VOA extends and enriches the traditional data-sinkhource orientation of 
current viewpoint approaches to incorporate aspects of viewpoint classification and 
different modes of interaction.” [KOT092] The VOA framework supports: 
1) Requirements capture and resolution 
2) Classifying and analyzing viewpoint-system interaction 
3) Integrating functional and non-functional aspects of requirements 
VOA supports the identification of key system objects, their attributes, and their 
methods. The authors focus on the viewpoint layer. VOA includes four main stages: 1) 
viewpoint identification, 2) viewpoint structuring and decomposition, 3) information 
collection, and 4) reconciliation of information across viewpoints. [KOT092] 
VOA identifies a viewpoint as “an external entity that interacts with the system 
being analyzed, but one that can exist without the presence of the system.” [KOT092] 
Viewpoints fall into two classes: 
1) Active viewpoints - entities that initiate some form of interaction between 
themselves and the system either by requesting services or providing control 
information to the system. 
2) Passive viewpoints - essentially data stores or sinks. Any interaction between 
them and the system is initiated by the system. 
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Control information defines and describes how the environment controls the 
system and how the system controls the environment. In VOA, there are two levels of 
control, the viewpoint level and the system level. At the viewpoint level, controls are 
concerned with “the description of signals to start and stop specific services.” [KOT092] 
At the system level, controls are concerned with “associating control information 
described at the viewpoint level with entities in the system responsible for the provision 
of services.” [KOT092] 
Viewpoint structuring provides the engineer with a tool for splitting the analytic 
tasks associated with viewpoints into a number of specification levels. A viewpoint is a 
hierarchy with differing levels of abstraction or specialization. The top level contains the 
most abstract description, and the lowest is most specialized. Each lower level inherits 
the services, attributes, control information, and non-functional constraints of the more 
abstract viewpoints. The sub-viewpoints may have their own constraints on inherited 
services and may also have their own particular service requirements. 
VOA uses standard forms to collect information associated with a viewpoint. 
Information reconciliation is used “to ensure that all the required services are provided 
for, and that omissions or conflicting information can be identified and problems 
resolved.” [KOT092] According to Kotonya and Sommerville, VOA provides a 
powerful framework for integrating functional and non-functional aspects of 
requirements . 
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F. POLICY WORKBENCH 
Sibley, Michael, and Wexelblat discuss the use of a policy workbench to aid in 
analyzing proposed policy, maintain a policy database, and assist in policy enforcement. 
The authors discuss the requirements, preliminary design, and prototype implementation 
of such a workbench. The objective of their research was to demonstrate computer 
support for a policy maker, enforcer, and user. The authors state that policy is often 
embedded in a system. [SIBL92] 
The following are the requirements for a general policy workbench: 
1) “The workbench outputs must be understandable by almost anybody with the 
domain knowledge in which the system is to be used.” [SIBL92] 
2) “The underpinnings of the policy representation must be based on appropriate 
formalisms but not be domain specific.” [SIBL92] 
The authors define five classes of people who need to deal with organizational 
policy: 1) policy maker, 2) policy maintainer, 3) policy implementer, 4) policy enforcer, 
and 5) policy user or designer of a system. 
One of the requirements for a policy workbench is “the ability to represent policy 
in a way that can be supported by formal analysis.” [SIBL92] They discuss possible 
problems in policy representation: 
1) Tend to be abstract and stated in imprecise language 
2) Are often incomplete and inconsistent 
3) Are often interdependent and nested 
4) May be very large 
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5 )  Need to represent time as an important component 
6) Require a statement of intent to be fully representable 
7) Fall along a wide spectrum of scope, from general to specific [SIBL92] 
The policy workbench is comprised of the following three tools [SIBL92]: 
1) “A theorem and assertion analyzer [entering and exercising policy] to check 
inputs, stated as axioms and theorems” 
2) “A rule compiler-generator-interpreter [selecting, merging and generating 
parts of systems] to produce an executable component of the system” 
3)  “An interactive policy structurer and selector [aidmg in understandmg and 
applying policy] to check what rules are applicable to a given situation and 
preprocessing the rules into pre- and post-conditions” 
The authors placed emphasis on “developing and experimenting with a prototype 
policy workbench that supports each software development phase.” [SIBL92] 
G. CONFLICTS IN POLICY-BASED DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 
Lupu and Sloman focus on policy conflicts and the problems of conflict detection 
and resolution. Distributed systems contain a large number of objects. New components 
and services are added and removed from the system dynamically, which changes the 
requirements of the management system over its lifetime. [LUPU97] 
The authors state that policies are a means of specifying and influencing 
management behavior within a distributed system, without coding the behavior into the 
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management agents. The authors’ approach is aimed at specifying implementable 
policies. They define two types of policies: 
1) Authorization policies - security policies related to access control and specify 
what activities a subject is permitted or forbidden to do to/with a set of target 
objects 
2) Obligation policies - specify what activities a subject must or must not do to a 
set of target objects and define the duties of the policy subject 
The authors permit specification of both positive and negative authorization 
policies and require explicit authorization. They state that conflicts can arise in the set of 
policies due to omissions, errors, or conflicting requirements of the administrators 
specifying the policies. For example, an obligation policy may define an activity a 
manager must perform, but there is no authorization policy to permit the manager to 
perform the activity. Conflicts can also arise between positive and negative policies 
applying to the same objects. Whenever multiple policies apply to an object, there is the 
potential for some form of conflict, but multiple policies are essential. Many policies 
specified for the management of a large system specify exceptions to more general 
policies. The system may have to resolve conflicts such as exceptions to normal 
authorization policies. A precedence relationship is established between policies to 
resolve conflicts. 
The authors use roles as the mean of grouping policies related to a particular 
manager position. Then managers can be assigned or removed from the position without 
changing the policies. They also define the relationships between roles with regard to the 
- 
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use of shared resources or with regard to organizational structure. The authors use roles 
and inter-role relationships to provide a scope for the conflict detection and help to limit 
the number of policies that must be examined in order to detect conflicts. They focus on 
techniques and tool support for off-line (static) detection and resolution, although some 
conflicts can be detected only at run-time (dynamic). ILUpU971 
The authors state that policies are interpreted by automated manager agents, so the 
behavior of the agents can be modified dynamically by changing policy rather than re- 
coding. Obligation policies can be either used in conjunction with authorizations in order 
to ensure the integrity of the system or to specify the actions a component must initiate in 
response to changes in its internal state or environment. [LUPU97] 
The authors discuss the details of the domains, policies, and roles, which form 
their management framework. They also discuss the types of inconsistencies and the 
policy conflicts that they need to detect. Next they explain their approach to conflict 
detection and conflict resolution based on policy-precedence relationships. [LUPU97] 
The authors state that domains are used to partition objects in a large system 
according to geographical boundaries, object type, management functionality, 
responsibility, and authority. Domains may also be used to group objects in order to 
apply a common policy to a set of objects. A sub-domain is a domain which is a member 
of another domain or parent domain. [LUPU97] 
The authors discuss in detail the notation used to specify policies. Authorization 
(A) and Obligation (0) policies may be positive or negative. The authors also provide 
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some example policies and show how conflicts can occur due to positive and negative 
policies. [LUPU97] 
They define modality conjlicts as inconsistencies in the policy specification which 
can occur when two or more policies with modalities of opposite sign refer to the same 
subjects, actions, and targets. There are three types of modality conflicts: 
1) O+/O-: the subjects are both required to and required not to perform the same 
actions on the target objects 
2) A+/A-: the subjects are both authorized and forbidden to perform the actions 
on the target objects 
3) O+/A-: the subjects are required but forbidden to perform the actions on the 
target objects; obligation does not imply authorization 
The authors focus their attention on a static conflict detection tool, which assists 
the users in specifying policies, roles, and relationships. They discuss some principles for 
the detection of modality conflicts and present an implementation of the conflict detection 
tool. 
They propose that using a policy precedence relationship can reduce the number 
of conflicts between policies and permit inconsistent specifications. The following are 
the principles for establishing precedence: 
1) Negative policies always have priority 
2) Assigning explicit priorities 
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3) Distance between a policy and the managed objects - priority is given to the 
policy applying to the closer class in the inheritance hierarchy when evaluating 
access to an object reference in a query 
4) Specificity related to domain nesting - can be used within conflict detection to 
reduce the number of potential conflicts 
The authors state that modality conflicts can be detected purely by syntactic 
analysis of the policies. Application-specific conflicts arise from the semantics of the 
policy and are specified in terms of constraints on attribute values of permitted policies; 
they call these meta-policies. The authors use a prototype conflict detection tool to detect 
overlaps between policies and optionally apply domain nesting-based precedence. 
[LUPU97] 
The authors found that assigning positive or negative policies were limiting and 
not as intuitive as the precedence-based approach on specificity. They actually only 
implement positive authorizations and remove negative authorizations by refinement of 
the policies. They assume all actions are prohibited unless explicitly authorized. Their 
policies are not global; the policies are interpreted by explicitly specified subjects (for 
obligations) and targets (for authorization). [LUPU97] 
The authors discuss Sibley, Mchael, and Wexelblat’s Policy Workbench. They 
state that the Policy Workbench uses automated tools to specify and analyze policies. 
The authors state that this approach is complex due to the generality of their policies. The 
Policy Workbench is not based on precedence relationships. 
39 
In summary, Lupu and Sloman presented the integration of a conflict detection 
tool in a role and policy-based framework. They performed off-line, static analysis of a 
set of policies to determine two types of conflicts: 
1) Modality conflicts - arising from positive and negative policies, which can be 
checked by analyzing the syntax of the policies 
2) Application specific conflicts - need to be expressed by external constraints or 
meta-policies 
They make use of precedence relationship based on the specificity of the policies 
with respect to domain nesting to reduce the number of potential overlaps indicated to a 
user and allow inconsistencies between policies to exist within a system. The authors 
implemented a prototype role framework which supports distributed policy and domain 
servers and analysis of a set of policies. Their approach is “to detect as many conflicts as 
possible at time of specification, rather than leaving them to be detected at run-time.” 
[LUPU97] The user can then modify the policies to remove conflicts. The authors 
implemented their approach using a CORBA-based distributed programming 
environment . 
The authors concentrated on the static analysis of policies. They stated that an 
area needing more research is dynamic run-time conflict detection. Some constraints can 
only be evaluated at run-time, since they depend on object states or current time. 
[LUPU97] 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 
A. MOTIVATION 
Ballistic missiles have been a threat to the U.S. and its military operations for over 
fifty years. The global proliferation of ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass 
destruction is one of the most immediate and dangerous threats to U.S. national security 
in the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles in the world 
today poses a direct, immediate threat to many of our allies and to some U.S. forces 
deployed abroad in defense of our national interests. Over time, the proliferation of 
longer-range missiles could pose a greater threat to the U.S. itself. [MOSH97] 
The U.S. has already witnessed the willingness of countries to use theater-class 
ballistic missiles for military purposes; e.g., the use of Scuds during the Gulf War. Since 
1980, ballistic missiles have been used in six regional conflicts. Strategic ballistic 
missiles, including intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs 
and SLBMs), exist in abundance in the world today. There is also great concern from the 
emergence of a Third World long-range missile threat to the United States. 
[BMDOLINK] 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) plays a central role in U.S. national security 
strategy by supporting its defense and counterproliferation objectives. [BMDOLINK] 
The requirement for BMD stems from a strategy that requires the U.S. to maintain an 
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overseas presence and the capability to respond to major regional conflicts despite the 
increasing danger posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. 
In a world of regional threats to the U.S., BMD affords the U.S. greater 
freedom of action to protect its interests and uphold its security 
commitments without fear of coercion. BMD can bolster the solidarity of 
coalitions and alliances, as it did during Desert Storm in 1991, and provide 
a response to crises without having to resort to offensive measures. 
Finally, BMD can strengthen the credibility of our deterrent forces and 
provide an essential hedge against the failure of deterrence. 
[BMDOLNK] 
B. DESCRIPTION OF BMD SYSTEM 
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), an agency of the 
Department of Defense (DoD), is “responsible for managing directing, and executing the 
BMD Program.” [BMDOLINK] The BMD program is a two-part missile defense 
program. First priority is given to Theater Missile Defense (TMD) to meet the existing 
threat to deployed U.S. and allied forces. Second priority is assigned to National Missile 
Defense (NMD) as a hedge against the emergence of long-range ballistic missile threats. 
[BMDOLINK] 
1. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
Theater Missile Defenses are designed to protect U.S. deployed troops and 
coalition forces. TMD systems must be able to deploy rapidly and be highly mobile. 
“Since the TMD threat is diverse with respect to range and capability, no single system 
can perform the entire TMD mission.” [BMDOLINK] To adequately perform TMD, an 
integrated Family of Systems (FoS) is required. (See Table 1) ‘The FoS concept is an 
evolving, flexible configuration of interoperable weapon systems, Command and Control . 
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(C2) centers, and internavexternal sensors.” [BMD099G] Development of these systems 
is dispersed throughout the Services and Agencies. BMDO states that the FoS approach 
will ensure a defense in depth, utilizing lower-tier (low-altitude), upper-tier (high- 
altitude), and boost-phase defenses. [BMD099G] 
I System Name (Deployment mode /Approximate radius of ]Intended to defend against: [Type of warhead I 
Table 1. US Theater Missile Defenses 
This table lists the main U.S. theater missile defense systems that are either operational (Patriot PAC-2) or 
under development. [MOSH97] 
a) Lower-Tier Defenses 
Lower-tier defenses are designed to intercept missiles low in the 
atmosphere (at altitudes less than approximately 20 lulometers). [MOSH97] The 
interceptors must intercept their targets in the atmosphere because the interceptors 
maneuver to their target by using fins to steer through the air. Lower-tier defenses have 
relatively slow-flying interceptors that cannot fly very far before intercepting their targets; 
therefore, lower-tier defenses can cover only relatively small areas. Lower-tier defenses 
are designed to intercept short-range ballistic missiles, with ranges of up to roughly 600 
43 
to 1,500 kilometers, depending on the system. [MOSH97] In addition, these defenses are 
designed to shoot down aircraft and cruise missiles. [BMD099G] 
The United States currently has one lower-tier theater defense in operation, 
the Patriot PAC-2. The lower defense systems currently under development by the U.S. 
are the Patriot PAC-3, the Navy Area Defense, and the Medium-range Extended Air 
Defense System (MEADS). [BMDO99A] 
(1) Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2). According 
to Mosher, the PAC-2 is a transportable, truck-mounted system designed to defend small 
areas against aircraft and ballistic missiles with ranges of up to about 600 kilometers. 
[MOSH97] The interceptor uses a “blast fragmentation” warhead that is designed to 
explode once it gets within several meters of its target. During the Gulf War, the Patriot 
air defense system made its “famous battlefield debut against tactical ballistic missiles 
and helped defend coalition forces and Israeli territory against Iraqi Scud missile attacks.” 
[BMD099D] The current PAC-2 version is an upgraded version of the Patriot PAC-2 
defense that was used during the Gulf War. Since the Gulf War, BMDO and the Army 
have significantly increased the effectiveness of the Patriot system by deploying the PAC- 
2 Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) which was developed to improve the Patriot’s 
accuracy against short-range ballistic missiles. [BMD099D] 
(2) Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). Mosher 
describes the PAC-3 as a transportable, truck-mounted system designed to defend small 
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areas against ballistic missiles with ranges up to about 1,500 kilometers. [MOSH97] 
Unlike the PAC-2, this system does not use an explosive warhead. The PAC-3 uses a 
“hit-to-lull” interceptor (based on the earlier Erint missile), which is designed to destroy 
its target by hitting it directly. [MOSH97] 
According to BMDO, the PAC-3 is a core TMD system 
with one of the highest priorities in the development of BMD systems. [BMD099D] Its 
mission is to provide the lower tier of the BMD architecture. This includes defending 
troops and fixed assets from short and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, 
and other air breathing threats such as fixed or rotary wing aircraft. To accomplish this 
mission, the PAC-3 system will be designed to be a “highly advanced missile defense 
system that can destroy enemy threats with hit-to-kill accuracy in the terminal phase of 
the threat missile’s flight.” [BMD099D] “The PAC-3 system is planned to be 
interoperable with other Army and Joint systems, to provide a seamless missile defense in 
depth, and to be air-transportable to support rapid deployments.” [BMD099D] 
PAC-3 systems contain four basic components: a radar set, 
an engagement control station (ECS), a launching station, and interceptors. The radar 
station provides warning and tracking of incoming threats and a continuous update link 
with in-flight interceptors. “The ECS computes fire solutions for the interceptor and 
provides fire control and a communications link with other Patriot units.” [BMD099D] 
The launch station transports, protects, and launches the missiles. Each launch station 
can be equipped with four GEM or earlier missiles. The PAC-3 missile uses its high 
maneuverability and hit-to-kill accuracy to destroy its target. [BMD099D] 
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(3) Navy Area Defense. Navy Area Defense is a ship- 
based system designed to defend small areas against aircraft and ballistic missiles with 
ranges up to 600 kilometers. [MOSH97] Like the Patriot PAC-2, this system will use an 
explosive warhead. AEGIS cruisers and destroyers, equipped with a modified AEGIS 
combat system (ACS), will detect and track short-to-medium range TBMs and engage 
them with the Standard M~ssile-2 (SM-2) Block IVA interceptor. [BMD099B] 
The Navy Area Defense system “represents a lower-tier 
TMD capability that can take advantage of the strength and presence of the naval forces, 
and build upon the existing AEGIS infrastructure.” [BMDOLINK] Naval vessels, which 
are routinely deployed worldwide, are currently in potential threat areas or can be rapidly 
redirected or repositioned. A Naval TMD capability can therefore be placed within a 
region of conflict to provide TMD protection for nearby land-based assets before 
hostilities erupt or before land-based defenses can be transported into the theater. 
[BMD099B] 
(4) Medium-range Extended Air Defense System 
(MEADS). The last of the lower-tier systems is the Medium-range Extended Air Defense 
System, formerly the Corps SAM [surface-to-air missile] program. MEADS is the only 
theater missile defense system under consideration to provide maneuver forces with 360- 
degree defense protection against the real and growing threat of short-range tactical 
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. [MOSH97] This system 
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is intended to provide fundamental enhancements in tactical mobility, strategic 
deployability and operational capability. [BMD099F] 
MEADS is a truck-mounted system designed to be more 
mobile than the Patriot systems and to be deployed with ground troops as they move in 
the field. [MOSH97] By contrast, Patriot is designed to be operated from a single 
1ocati.on for days at a time or longer. MEADS uses a hit-to-kill warhead and is designed 
to intercept ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 600 kilometers. MEADS is an 
international program under joint development with the United States, Germany, and 
Italy. [BMD099F] 
b) Upper-Tier Defenses 
Upper-tier defenses are designed to intercept missiles high in the 
atmosphere or above the atmosphere. [MOSH97] This pennits large ground areas to be 
covered. At the same time, upper-tier defenses are designed to intercept longer-range 
theater missiles, with ranges of up to 3,500 kilometers. Upper-tier defenses are also 
intended to be used as the first layer of a layered defense against short-range missiles, 
with the lower-tier theater defenses providing the second layer of defense. [BMD099G] 
The United States has two upper-tier defenses under development, Theater 
High-Altitude Area Defense (TmAD) and Navy Theater Wide (NTW). Both use hit-to- 
kill interceptors that maneuver to their target by using small thrusters to change their 
trajectory. [MOSH97] These interceptors operate at high altitudes where there is not 
enough air to enable them to maneuver by using fins. The interceptors currently under 
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development use infrared sensors to detect the target and home on it. These sensors, 
which detect heat, will be blinded if they are used at low altitudes where the air resistance 
causes heating of the fast-flying sensor. Thus, early upper-tier interceptors will have a 
minimum intercept altitude below which they cannot intercept a target. [MOSH97] 
(1) Theater High Altitude Area Defense System 
(THAAD). THAAD is a land-based system intended to defend large areas against 
missiles with ranges of up to 3,500 kilometers. [MOSH97] THAAD is designed to be 
transportable by aircraft and to intercept missiles high in the atmosphere (at altitudes 
above about 40 kilometers) or above the atmosphere. The THAAD interceptor has a top 
speed of about 2.5 lulometers per second. [BMD099E] 
The THAD system is a critical element of the TMD FoS. 
[BMD099E] THAAD is used to engage short, medium, and long-range ballistic 
missiles. The THAAD system’s ability to intercept missiles at long range and high 
altitude (endo- and exo-atmospheric) will give U.S. forces the best chance to shoot down 
incoming missiles far enough out so that post-intercept debris will not harm U.S. troops, 
which is a vital concern if a missile carries a weapon of mass destruction. [MOSH97] 
This ability will also give the U.S. TBMD forces the time to judge the success of an 
intercept attempt and, if necessary, launch more interceptors from T H A D  or other 
missile defense systems. As the upper tier of a two-tiered TMD architecture, THAAD 
provides near leak proof protection when employed with PAC-3 or Navy Area Defense. 
[MOSH97] THAAD system development started in 1992, and it is the most mature 
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upper-tier system. It is expected to be fielded in 2007. Currently THAAD is undergoing 
testing and development. [BMD099E] 
The THAAD system consists of four principle components: 
truck-mounted launchers, interceptors, the THAAD Radar system, and the THAAD 
BM/C4I system. The purpose of the mobile launcher is to protect, transport, and fire the 
interceptors. “The interceptors will consist of a single stage booster and a kinetic lull- 
vehicle that will destroy targets by colliding with them.” [BMD099E] The THAAD 
radar will support surveillance, target tracking, and fire control functions, and provide a 
communications link with THAAD interceptors in-flight. THAAD’s BWC4I system will 
manage and integrate all THAAD components. [BMD099E] The BWC4I system will 
link the THAAD system to other missile defense and air defense systems to support a 
multi-tiered, highly effective, interoperable TMD architecture. The THAAD system will 
be transported by air on a C-141 cargo aircraft. [BMD099E] 
(2) Navy Theater Wide (NTW) Defense. NTW is a 
ship-based system intended to defend large areas against missiles with ranges of up to 
3,500 kilometers. [MOSH97] NTW is designed to intercept medium- and long-range 
TBMs only above the atmosphere; it will use the LEAP (lightweight exo-atmospheric 
projectile) kinetic kill vehicle, which cannot intercept at altitudes below about 80-100 
lulometers. [MOSH97] The system will not be able to intercept short-range missiles with 
a range less than about 300-400 kilometers, since they never reach an altitude of 80-100 
kilometers. Navy Theater Wide is intended to intercept targets in the middle of their 
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trajectory (in mid-course) or, if the ship can position itself near the missile launch site, in 
the beginning of their trajectory shortly after the missile engine finishes burning (in 
ascenthoost phase). The interceptor has a speed of about 4.5 kilometers per second. 
[BMD099C] 
The system will be deployed on AEGIS ships, which use 
the SPY radar system. [BMD099C] The NTW will be able to take advantage of the 
mobility of Navy AEGIS equipped ships and provide BMD protection to U.S. and 
coalition forces throughout the world. This is especially important in the early stages of 
conflict when land-based BMD assets are either unavailable or limited in number or 
location. [BMD099C] 
A second-generation system, Navy Theater Wide Block II, 
is also planned for deployment after 2010. This system will use a faster interceptor and a 
more powerful radar. [BMD099C] 
c) Boost-Phase Defenses 
The United States is also developing systems to intercept missiles during 
the early, powered part of flight when the rocket booster is burning. This part of the 
missile's trajectory is called the "boost phase," and the ballistic missile defenses are 
termed boost-phase defenses. The advantage of boost-phase defenses is that they are 
designed to destroy the missile before the warhead and any decoys are released, so there 
would be only one target to destroy rather than potentially dozens or hundreds. 
[MOSH97] A boost-phase defense would also be able to destroy submunitions before 
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they were released. Deploying chemical or biological weapons on numerous 
submunitions would be the best way for an attacker to distribute the agents and would 
simply overwhelm any mid-course or terminal defense system. [MOSH97] The 
disadvantage of boost-phase defenses is that the boost phase lasts for only a few minutes, 
and the interceptor must be able to make its intercept close to the launch site. There is 
currently one boost-phase theater defense under development, the Airborne Laser (ABL) 
[MOSH97] 
(1) Airborne Laser (ABL). ABL is designed to attack 
short and medium-range missiles during their boost phase with a laser based on a 
modified Boeing 747 airplane. [MOSH97] The laser would be targeted on the missile, 
and if it shined on the same spot for long enough, it would weaken the metal surface by 
heating it to its structural-failure temperature, where the strength of the metal falls 
dramatically. For theater missiles, the airplane must be within several hundred kilometers 
of the missile the laser is attacking. It is generally assumed that the airplane would need 
to fly outside the borders of a country to avoid being shot down by air defenses; thus, this 
system will be incapable of attacking missiles launched from the interior regions of 
relatively large countries. [MOSH97] The exception would be in a conflict in which the 
United States had already established air superiority. In principle, the airborne laser 
would also be capable of causing a long-range missile to fail. Russian and Chinese land- 
based missiles are not assumed to be vulnerable to the ABL though, since they are based 
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far inland. However, the airborne laser could, in principle, threaten Russia’s long-range 
SLBMs. [MOSH97] 
2. National Missile Defense (NMD) 
The NMD system is being developed to protect the United States from attack by a 
limited number of ICBMs armed with conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical 
warheads. [MOSH97] Such limited attacks, ranging from a few to a few tens of missiles, 
fall into three categories: 
1) A small accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia (or other former Soviet 
Union country) 
2) A deliberate or unauthorized attack from China, which has some two dozen 
ICBMs with a range capable of reaching the United States 
3) A deliberate attack from a hostile emerging missile state that might acquire 
long-range ballistic missiles [MOSH97] 
The third threat, focused on North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, has emerged as the 
primary argument for a near-term NMD deployment. The NMD program has anticipated 
for some time the possibility that a rogue state could acquire ICBMs that could threaten 
the United States. This possibility was underscored by the August 1998 North Korean 
attempt to launch a satellite on a Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) missile. [MOSH97] The launch 
demonstrated some important aspects of ICBM development, most notably multiple- 
stage separation. While the intelligence community expected a TD-1 launch for some 
time, it did not anticipate that the missile would have a third stage or that it would be used 
to attempt to place a satellite in orbit. [MOSH97] A three-stage variant of the TD-1, if 
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successfully developed and deployed, could pose a threat to portions of the United States 
as well as to the territory of U.S. allies and friends. [BMD099B] 
The intelligence community’s current view is that North Korea is more likely to 
develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile as a weapon. [BMDOOOA] The TD-2 is a 
derivative of TD-1 technology, employing a larger first stage and the No Dong theater 
ballistic missile as the second stage. A two-stage TD-2 will have the range to reach 
Alaska, while a three-stage variant could bring most of the lower 48 states within range of 
North Korean ballistic missiles. The intelligence community believes North Korea could 
test a TD-2 at any time, unless it is further delayed for political reasons. Other rogue 
nations, particularly Iran, could test an indigenously developed ICBM in the latter half of 
this decade, using foreign assistance. These nations may also pursue a TD-type ICBM, 
possibly with North Korean assistance or purchase such a North Korean system outright, 
in the next few years. [MOSH97] 
The NMD system being developed would defend all fifty states against a small 
number of ICBMs launched by a rogue state, such as North Korea. [BMDOOOA] The 
NMD program is currently in its development phase. A decision whether to begin 
deployment of a limited national missile defense (NMD) system will be made in mid- 
2000 and will be “based on technology development, affordability, the potential threat, 
international treaty considerations, and competing defense priorities.” [BMDOLINK] 
The NMD system is an integrated collection of subsystems, referred to as 
“elements,” that perform dedicated functions during an ICBM engagement. The system 
will include Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), four types of long-range sensors (the 
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Defense Support Program satellites, Space-Based Infrared System satellites, an Upgraded 
Early Warning Radar (UEWR), and a Ground-Based X-Band Radar (XBR)), and a 
BWC4I element. [BMDOOOA] 
The system will use GBIs topped with an exo-atmospheric lull vehicle @KV) that 
is designed to destroy the incoming warhead by colliding with it at high speed. 
[BMDOOOA] The GBI is a silo-based, three-stage, ICBM-class missile that delivers a 
separating EKV to an "acquisition point" above the atmosphere en route to engage a 
threat target. [BMDOOOA] At this point, in a manner similar to upper-tier theater missile 
defense systems, the EKV uses an infrared seeker to acquire and track the target, firing 
divert thrusters (for terminal guidance and control) to achieve a direct hit on the targeted 
reentry vehicle. This collision will take place above the atmosphere, when the warhead is 
in the mid-course of its trajectory. [MOSH97] 
The launch of an attacking missile would first be detected by U.S. early warning 
satellites. The existing satellites, known as Defense Support Program @SP) satellites, 
use infrared sensors to detect the hot plume of a missile booster in the early stage of its 
flight. Beginning in 2004, the DSP satellites will be replaced by a new system of early 
warning satellites known as SBIRS-high (Space-Based Infrared System-high-earth orbit), 
which will also use infrared sensors to detect missile plumes but have improved 
capabilities. [BMDOOOA] The data from the early warning satellites will be fed to the 




Once the booster finishes burning, the NMD system will use different sensors to 
detect the missile and any objects it releases, to track these objects accurately enough to 
guide the interceptors, and to discriminate the real warhead from decoys or other false 
targets. [MOSH97] These sensors include five existing early-warning radars, in 
Massachusetts, California, central Alaska, Greenland, and Britain, which will be 
upgraded to give them the ability to track targets accurately enough to guide interceptors. 
[BMDOOOA] New XBRs designed specifically for NMD and with much greater 
discrimination capabilities will also be deployed. These ground-based radars will be 
supplemented by a space-based system of roughly 24 SBIRS-low (Space-Based Infrared 
System-low-earth orbit) missile-trackmg satellites that are designed to provide track data 
accurate enough to guide interceptors without assistance from other sensors. 
[BMDOOOA] 
At some point in this process, the system must discriminate the actual warhead 
from the other objects. Otherwise, the NMD system, having a limited number of 
interceptors, would risk running out of interceptors if it attempted to fire at all the objects. 
[LEWI97] Because the NMD interceptors are designed to intercept their targets above 
the atmosphere, where there is no air resistance and where lightweight objects travel on 
the same trajectory as a heavy warhead, the system will be particularly vulnerable to 
countermeasures that use numerous lightweight decoys. [EWI97] 
The NMD Battle Management Center will integrate the information from the 
various sensors and decide which objects the system should try to intercept. The NMD 
system will then launch interceptors and guide them towards their targets. An In-Flight 
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Interceptor Communications Systems (IFICS), which will consist of several ground 
stations deployed at forward locations, will relay communications from the Battle 
Management Center to interceptors that have flown over the horizon. [MOSH97] As 
each interceptor nears its assigned target, it will release the EKV, which will use infrared 
and visible light sensors to detect the target and attempt to discriminate it from decoys or 
other false targets. [MOSH97] Finally, the EKV will home on the target and use thruster 
rockets to steer itself into the target. 
To increase its odds of success, the NMD system would likely fire several 
interceptors at each target. To conserve interceptors, if time permits, the defense will use 
a shoot-look-shoot strategy, in which one or more interceptors are fired at the target, and 
after observing the results of the intercept attempts, additional interceptors are fired if 
necessary. Current plans reportedly call for firing four interceptors at each target. 
[BMDOOOA] 
The United States plans to build the NMD in three stages, with the capability of 
the system designed to increase in each stage. [BMDOOOA] The first system 
configuration, called the Capability-1 (C-1) system, is designed to defend against an 
attack of a "few, simple" warheads. This initial system would be augmented to provide a 
Capability-2 (C-2) system, designed to defend against a "few, complex" warheads. The 
stated goal of the NMD program is to deploy a Capability-3 (C-3) system, designed to 
defend against "many, complex" warheads. The term "few" refers to five or fewer 
warheads. The dividing line between the terms "simple" and "complex" refer to the 
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extent to which the attacker has incorporated countemeasures to fool or overwhelm the 
defense. [BMDOOOA] 
These three system configurations will differ from each other in several ways. 
The most obvious difference is in the number of interceptors. The C-1 system will have 
20 interceptors deployed at a single site in the United States, the C-2 system will increase 
the number of interceptors at this site to 100, and the C-3 system will deploy a total of 
more than 100 interceptors at multiple sites in the United States. [BMDOOOA] The 
number and types of sensors available to the NMD system in each case will also differ. 
The number of X-band radars will increase as the system evolved from the C-1 to the C-3 
configuration, and the SBIRS-low sensors would first be deployed with the C-2 system. 
[BMDOOOA] 
The initial site will be either Grand Forks, North Dakota or central Alaska. The 
site not chosen for initial deployment will likely be used as a second site for the C-3 
system. The Clinton administration has indicated it is leaning strongly towards an initial 




In-Right Interceptor Central Alaska Central Alaska Central Alaska 
Communications Systems Caribou (Maine) Caribou Caribou 




DSP or SBIRS-fish? Yes Yes Yes 
SBIRS-low? No Yes Yes 
Source: US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. March 3. I999 viewgraph 
Table 2. Preliminary Architecture for C-1, C-2, and C-3 NMD Systems 
3. Battle ManagementKommand, Control, Communication, Computers 
& Intelligence (BWC41) System 
The primary goal of BWC4I is “to provide the warfighter with an integrated 
BMD capability by building-in the interoperability and flexibility to satisfy a wide range 
of threats and scenarios.” [BMDOLINK] BWC4I is one of the most important systems 
of the BMD and is essential in order to take advantage of the full capabilities of the core 
BMD weapons systems. “Successful BWC4I increases the time available to engage 
hostile missiles, increases the effective allocation of interceptors, and reduces the 
potential for attacking missiles to penetrate U.S. defenses.” [BMDOLINK] 
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According to BMDO, “effective BWC4I decreases the number of interceptors 
required by improving weapon system fire distribution and coordmation and through 
sensor fusion.” [BMDOLINK] It provides multiple information paths between sensors, 
shooters, and control locations to combat sensor outages and jamming. BWC4I weapon 
cueing information also increases battlespace and depth of fire, improves defense against 
long-range threats, and increases the defended area. BWC4I also “supports passive 
defense measures by providing greater early warning and faster reaction times.” 
[BMDOLINK] 
The BWC4I architecture for TMD is built upon the existing C2 structure for 
Theater Air Defense (TAD) and adds the communications linkmg TMD C2 nodes, 
weapons, and sensors, and the TMD interfaces to intelligence systems and other 
supporting capabilities. [BMDOLINK] Interoperability in BWC4I is essential for 
successful joint TMD operations. 
C. CHALLENGES 
All ballistic missile defenses are vulnerable to countermeasures. Despite decades 
of research, dealing with countermeasures remains a key unsolved problem facing missile 
defenses. It is easier for the attacker to deploy effective countermeasures against defenses 
than it is for the defense to respond to such countermeasures. [LEWI97] 
Effective countermeasures can be cheap and use simple technology - much 
simpler than the technology required to build long-range missiles. One method the 
attacker can use is to overwhelm the defense by making the warhead hard to detect, 
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leaving the defense without enough time to intercept it. The attacker can also use 
methods to prevent the defense from identifying the true warhead. If the United States 
deploys a national missile defense, it must expect that any developing country that would 
build or buy long-range missiles to deliver an attack would also make sure these missiles 
had countermeasures to penetrate the defense. [LEWI97] 
Building an effective defense against long-range missiles is difficult even without 
the use of Countermeasures. First, the ground-based radar or satellite-based sensor must 
detect and track the attacking warhead early enough for the interceptor to reach the 
warhead. Second, the defense must accurately calculate the projected intercept point and 
launch an interceptor toward it. Third, the infrared sensor on the interceptor must detect 
the warhead far enough away to give the interceptor time to maneuver. Finally, the 
interceptor must maneuver accurately enough to hit the warhead, which is a small object, 
at a closing speed of greater than 10 lulometers per second (22,000 miles per hour). 
[LEWI97] 
The attacker does not need to do much to make intercepts all but impossible. To 
defeat a defense, the attacker needs for only one countermeasure to work. For a defense 
to be reliably effective, it must work against all countermeasures the attacker might use 
and must work the first time it encounters them. Many countermeasure techniques are 
available for the attacker to use. Three countermeasure examples are: 
1 ) The attacker can overwhelm the defense. 
2 )  The attacker can make the warhead hard to detect, leaving the defense 
without enough time to intercept. 
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3 )  The attacker can prevent the defense from identifying the true warhead. 
[LEWI97] 
1. 
Chemical and biological warheads can be divided into many small parts called 
submunitions that can be released early in flight, just after the booster stops thrusting. 
This creates so many reentering targets that it overwhelms the defense and would 
therefore defeat any midcourse or terminal defense. Dividing the warhead into 
submunitions is also beneficial to the attacker because it distributes the chemical or 
biological agent more efficiently over the target area. The intelligence community has 
stated that they believe North Korea will be able to deploy submunitions, and that this 
technology could be available on the world market by 2000. [LEWI97] 
Attacker Can Overwhelm the Defense 
2. 
The infrared sensor on the interceptor, which guides it to the final intercept, 
detects the heat emitted by the warhead. Cooling the surface of the warhead thus makes it 
more difficult to detect. A small amount of liquid nitrogen in a thin shroud surrounding 
the warhead could cool the surface enough to reduce the distance at which the infrared 
sensor could detect the warhead by 10,000 times. The interceptor would have only a few 
thousandths of a second to react, in which time it could not maneuver enough to have any 
chance of intercepting a warhead traveling at 7,000 meters per second. [LEWI97] 
Attacker Can Make the Warhead Hard to Detect 
Such cooling would also make the warhead much less visible to the infrared 
detectors on satellite-based sensors such as the planned Space and Missile Tracking 
System, giving the defense less time to work. Similarly, the warhead can be made more 
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difficult to detect by radar by reducing its radar cross-section using simple techniques 
such as adding a sharp nose, curving its back end, and covering it with radar-absorbing 
material. [LEWI97] 
3. Attacker Can Prevent the Defense from Identifying the True 
Warhead 
Above the atmosphere, where long-range missiles would be intercepted, objects of 
different weights and shapes travel at the same speed and follow the same path. This 
allows a missile to carry a large number of lightweight decoys to confuse the defense. 
These decoys do not need to be aerodynamic and need not even look like the warhead 
since the warhead could also be disguised. Such decoys would force the defense either to 
launch interceptors at all the targets or to wait until the atmosphere strips away the 
lightweight objects, by which time it could be too late to launch interceptors against the 
warhead. [LEWI97] 
A simple and effective countermeasure is to place the warhead in a metalized 
mylar balloon and release it within a large cloud of empty balloons. Each of these targets 
would move at the same speed and could not be distinguished by the missile defense 
radar. Addmg a small heater to each balloon to heat each one by a different amount 
would prevent infrared sensors from detecting the real warhead. If desired, the attacker 
could also add a small vibrator to the balloons to mask any small motions the warhead 
might cause. The lightweight balloons would be stripped away by the atmosphere late in 
flight, but by that time they would already have done their job. [LEWI97] 
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4. Summary 
Given today’s technology, the United States can certainly build a defense that 
could destroy one or a few ICBM warheads under controlled conditions, where the 
characteristics of the target warhead are known to the defense and no serious effort is 
made to defeat the defense. However, the real question is whether the defense will be 
operationally effective; that is, will the defense be effective in the real world, where the 
characteristics of the attack would not be completely known in advance and where the 
attacker would take steps to defeat the defense? The key issue in determining operational 
effectiveness will be how well the system can deal with countermeasures intended to 
defeat the system. [LEW97] 
There are many countermeasures that are much easier to build and deploy than is 
either an ICBM or a nuclear warhead small enough to be delivered on an ICBM. Any 
country that has developed and deployed nuclear-armed ICBMs has clearly chosen to 
devote enormous resources to acquiring this capability. Thus, the United States must 
assume that any country with the technical capability and motivation to deploy an ICBM 
to attack or threaten the United States will also have the technical capability and 
motivation to deploy countermeasures to the U.S. BMD system. [LEWI97] 
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V. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM CASE STUDY 
A. VIEWPOINTS 
This case study is based on the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. We will 
demonstrate how the RM-ODP viewpoints can be used to aid in the definition of policy, 
requirements, and specifications of the BMD system. The BMD system is a good 
candidate to model using viewpoints because it is a complex, distributed, heterogeneous 
system comprised of the TMD and NMD subsystems. The TMD system is a multi-tiered 
family of systems further divided up into lower-tier, upper-tier, and boost-phase 
subsystems. There are currently three lower-tier subsystems being developed - PAC-3, 
Navy Area Defense, and MEADS. The two upper-tier subsystems being developed are 
THAAD and Navy Theater Wide. The only boost-phase subsystem being developed is 







Figure 3. Hierarchy of BMD System 
Ballistic Missile Defense involves many challenges. One of these challenges is 
the ability to hit a moving target. The use of countermeasures by an attacker makes it 
more difficult to hit the target. Another major challenge facing BMD is interoperability 
amongst all the systems. The RM-ODP viewpoints can be used to aid in modeling the 
BMD system to help address some of these challenges. 
The first step in modeling the BMD system with RM-ODP is to develop a 
reference model. The reference model provides the “big picture” that organizes the 
pieces of an ODP system into a coherent whole. A reference architecture may be derived 
from the reference model. The reference architecture is a starting point from which 
detailed specifications can be built. 
To construct the reference model of the BMD system, one must look at the “big 
picture” of the steps required to hit a moving target. First, DSP satellites using infrared 
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sensors would detect an attacking missile. This data is fed into the BWC4I network. 
The next step is to calculate the projected intercept point and launch an interceptor toward 
it. After the boost phase of the attacking missile, sensors in early warning radars are used 
to track the missile and discriminate the real warhead from decoys. The early warning 
radars are also used to guide the interceptor. The infrared sensor on the interceptor must 
detect the warhead far enough away to give the interceptor time to maneuver, and the 
interceptor must maneuver accurately enough to hit the warhead. Figure 4 illustrates the 
steps required to hit a target. 
Detec t  target Launch 
interceptor 
v I 
Track target and 
guide interceptor Hit  target 
Figure 4. Steps Required to Hit Moving Target 
Once the reference model has been identified, the viewpoints can be explored. 
RM-ODP addresses the problems faced by many organizations today, especially DoD, in 
choosing the right architecture. This case study uses viewpoints to model the BMD 
system, where each viewpoint encapsulates part of the requirements for the system. The 
requirements engineering process for a large, complex system such as BMD involves the 
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participation of many developers with different specialties and roles (such as contractor, 
project manager, electrical engineering, safety engineering, etc.). Each development team 
can hold different views of the system. Different contractors and military services are 
additionally building each of the subsystems of the TMD system. Specifying the BMD 
system using the RM-ODP viewpoints can allow for an otherwise large and complex 
specification to be separated into manageable pieces with each focused on the issues 
relevant to each member of the development team. For example, the systems analyst 
works with the information specification while the systems programmer is concerned 
with the engineering viewpoint. The following sections illustrate how the five different 
RM-ODP viewpoints may aid in modeling the BMD system. 
B. ENTERPRISE VIEWPOINT 
The enterprise viewpoint focuses on the purpose, scope, and policies for the 
system. There are many policies to take into consideration when building and deploying 
such a wide range of ballistic missile defense systems. The success or failure of this 
system will depend on the technology used in the defenses and the tactics and 
technologies used in missile attacks. The type of policy that is modeled in this case study 
is interoperability of all the BMD subsystems. Interoperability is an ongoing challenge 
for the U.S. military. With the military becoming more joint, interoperability has become 
an even more important issue. 
To achieve interoperability, the policy of interoperability must be translated into 
requirements and specifications. A BMD system is a real-time, distributed system, so the 
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issues involved are complex. This distributed operating system is a collection of 
heterogeneous systems connected via a network that presents a global unified view of the 
system and its resources. It is a tightly coupled system that requires all participants to run 
their own copy of the same drstributed operating system. 
In the enterprise viewpoint, policies can be defined in terms of objects, 
communities, and the roles of the objects within the communities. Within the BMD 
community are objects, which are either passive or active. Some examples of active 
objects may be the contractors, systems engineers, program managers, military services, 
etc. Examples of passive objects could be the radar systems, the interceptors, BWC4I 
network, and DSP satellites. 
The communities are groupings of objects intended to achieve some purpose. The 
BMD system can be expressed in terms of a structure of communities. The BMD system 
as a whole is the community which is comprised of two main subcommunities: TMD and 
NMD. These subcommunities are further broken down into more subcommunities. 
Figure 5 is an illustration of the TMD subcommunity portion of the BMD community, 
which consists of three additional subcommunities. 
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I TMD 
Figure 5. TMD Subcommunity 
The roles of the objects, whether passive or active, are expressed in terms of 
policies. These policies dictate the behavior of the objects within the community. These 
policies have varying scope and may apply across the community, to a role, or a single 
action type. The policies can be implicit or explicit. An interoperability policy is an 
explicit policy. Another explicit policy in the BMD system is a security policy. 
When using the enterprise viewpoint, we maintain the highest level of abstraction. 
When constructing the enterprise viewpoint, it is necessary to view the BMD community 
as a combination of subcommunities (see Figures 3 and 4). Each of the objects within the 
subcommunities (TMD and NMD) has specific roles that they must perform. The objects 
within the three subcommunities of the TMD subcommunity also have specific roles. 
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Figure 6 is a simplified example of the enterprise viewpoint showing the 
interoperability policy domain of the BMD system or community. To simplify the figure, 
only the TMD and NMD subcommunities are modeled. 
TMD & NMD 
Interoperability Interoperabili ty Interoperability Policy 
Figure 6 .  Enterprise Viewpoint 
Figure 6 shows three interoperability policy domains: 1) TMD 2) NMD, and 3) 
Joint TMD & NMD. Within the TMD interoperability policy domain are interoperability 
requirements between and within each of the subcommunities of TMD. NMD has 
interoperability requirements within its subcommunity also. The Joint TMD and NMD 
interoperability policy domain define interoperability policies between the TMD and 
NMD domains. An example of a portion of the joint interoperability policy could be the 
following: the BMD system must be interoperable amongst all of the TMD and NMD 
subcommunities. A robust interoperable C41 system (BWC4I) is required to integrate the 
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BMD subcommunities and provide commanders with the facilities, communications, 
automated decision aides, and information they need to effectively plan and execute 
BMD operations. 
C. INFORMATION VIEWPOINT 
The information viewpoint focuses on the semantics of information and 
information processing. The information viewpoint is used to describe the information 
required by the BMD system through the use of schemas, which describe the state and 
structure of an object. This viewpoint can be used to further decompose the BMD 
system. 
Figure 7 shows an example configuration of RM-ODP objects in an information 
viewpoint that is appropriate to the policies in the enterprise viewpoint. It is a simplified 
example of the information viewpoint showing the information supporting the BMD 
community. Once again only the TMD and NMD subcommunities are modeled. The 
principle interoperability feature that must be represented is the fact that each of the sets 
of information entities is isolated from the others and that information only needs to be 
interoperable at certain levels within the subcommunities. 
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NMD TMD&NMD Joint Information Information 
Figure 7. Information Viewpoint 
Within the TMD information domain are interoperability requirements both 
between and within each of the subcommunities of TMD. Each subcommunity within the 
TMD information domain contains its own version of a radar system, launch system, and 
interceptor, and thus has different information needs. NMD has separate information 
requirements within its subcommunity also. The Joint TMD and NMD information 
domain would define information that is shared between the two subcommunities, and the 
systems that share this information need to be interoperable. 
An example of a TMD interoperability policy domain could include 
interoperability between the TMD and NDM subcommunities. An example of a portion 
of the joint interoperability policy is the C41 system required to support the BMD system. 
A robust interoperable C41 system (BWC41) is required to integrate the BMD 
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subcommunities (TMD and NMD) and provide commanders the facilities, 
communications, automated decision aides, and information they need to effectively plan 
and execute BMD operations. 
D. COMPUTATIONAL VIEWPOINT 
The computational viewpoint focuses on the functional decomposition of the 
system into objects, which interact at interfaces. RM-ODP’s computational viewpoint is 
object-based. The objects encapsulate data and methods, offer interfaces for interaction 
with other objects, and offer multiple interfaces. The computational viewpoint 
decomposes the information viewpoint down to a more detailed level. 
A computational specification further defines the objects within an ODP system, 
the activities within those objects, and the interactions that occur among objects. Most 
objects in a computational specification describe application functionality, and these 
objects are linked by bindings through which interfaces occur. The binding objects are 
used to describe complex interactions between objects. Figure 8 is a simplified 
illustration of the BM/C4I Network object with a lower-tier interface and an upper-tier 
interface. Both interfaces can be used to destroy a target, but the medium-range targets 
can only be destroyed through the upper-tier interface and the short-range targets can only 
be destroyed through the lower-tier interface. Each of the BM/C4I object’s interfaces is 
bound to a TMD object (Navy Area Defense or NTW). 
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Network Object Lower-tier Interface 
Detection Info 
Theater Wide 
Upper-tier Interface \ 
Figure 8. Computational Viewpoint 
E. ENGINEERING VIEWPOINT 
The engineering viewpoint focuses on the infrastructure required to support 
distributed interaction between objects in the system. The engineering viewpoint is not 
concerned with the semantics of the ODP application, except to determine its 
requirements for distribution and distribution transparency. The computational viewpoint 
is concerned with when and why objects interact, while the engineering viewpoint is 
concerned with how they interact. 
When modeling interoperability policy, the level of distribution transparency 
needed must be identified. Of the eight distribution transparencies mentioned in Chapter 
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2, the failure transparency, location transparency, access transparency, replication 
transparency, relocation transparency, and persistence transparency should all be 
considered. Of these transparencies, access transparency and failure transparency are the 
most important because the BMD system is a heterogeneous real-time system. 
Failure transparency masks failure within the distributed system to enhance fault 
tolerance. If a link or system within the dstributed system fails, the entire system should 
not fail. 
Access transparency is also an important transparency for the developer to 
consider. Access transparency hides the differences in data representation and procedure 
calling mechanism to enable interworking between heterogeneous computer systems. 
BMD is comprised of many different hardware platforms, operating systems, and 
programming languages. RM-ODP does not try to standardize the components of the 
system or unnecessarily influence the choice of technology. 
The fundamental entities described in the engineering viewpoint are objects and 
channels. Objects in the engineering viewpoint can be divided into two categories -basic 
engineering objects and infrastructure objects. Basic engineering objects correspond to 
the objects in the computational viewpoint. An example of an infrastructure object is a 
protocol object. A channel corresponds to a binding or binding object in the 
computational viewpoint. A channel provides the communication mechanism and 
contains or controls the distribution transparencies. 
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F. TECHNOLOGY VIEWPOINT 
The technology viewpoint focuses on the choice of technology for implementation 
of the system. RM-ODP has very few rules applicable to technology specifications and is 
difficult to model. This viewpoint further decomposes the system to allow for the choice 
of the distributed computing model that would be most appropriate. When choosing 
which distributed computing model to implement, an important issue to consider is the 
time constraint. The BMD system is a hard real-time system that must satisfy bounded 
time constraints or suffer severe consequences. The consequences of an undetected 
missile are severe; if a missile is undetected, it could inflict death and destruction in the 
targeted area. 
The BMD system will also be asynchronous because the events that occur are 
entirely unpredictable and caused by external sources. One cannot predict when an 
adversary may launch a missile. Load consideration should also be considered so that a 
single radar or missile system is not overloaded. 
Another important issue to consider when choosing the technology 
implementation of the BMD system is the network characteristics. There are four 
network characteristics that can affect the BMD system: 1) network latency, 2)  bandwidth 
versus cost, 3) routing optimization, and 4) micronetwork characteristics. Network 
latency can cause problems with timing predictability. Distributed real-time applications 
require constant bandwidth that can be costly. Distributed real-time systems must reside 
on a network and therefore are subject to the network topology and its affect on 
distribution and routing. Distributed real-time systems are subject to micronetwork 
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characteristics, such as buffer size, queue sizes, and the packet sizes allowed on the 
network. 
The BWC4I system is one of the most important systems of the BMD and is 
essential in order to take advantage of the full capabilities of the core BMD weapons 
systems. Successful BWC4I increases the time available to engage hostile missiles, 
increases the effective allocation of interceptors, and reduces the potential for attaclung 
missiles to penetrate U.S. defenses. 
G. SUMMARY 
The BMD case study presented only a simplistic view of the BMD system. The 
case study gave examples of how the RM-ODP viewpoints can be used to model BMD at 
a very high level. The five RM-ODP viewpoints showed aspects of the distributed 
system at a high level of abstraction chosen by the developers of the system. Through the 
use of RM-ODP, the various members of the development team can combine and 
coordinate together to generate specifications for the system. The developers can 
combine and coordinate efforts by composing the various views; they also make 
transformations between levels. When transformations are made between different 
viewpoints, though, the developers need to ensure that the views are consistent. 
Consistency is a necessity between levels as well as across viewpoints. Another 
important feature of RM-ODP is that the viewpoints can be reused at the various levels of 
abstraction. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. OBSERVATIONS 
In this thesis we defined a real operational problem of developing the complex 
distributed system known as BMD. RM-ODP and viewpoints were defined, and the 
operational problem was addressed using a viewpoints framework. The case study 
showed how the viewpoints could be applied at a very abstract level. This thesis 
demonstrated that the RM-ODP method may be useful for DoD in developing distributed 
s ys tems. 
We hypothesized that the policy, requirements, and specifications could be dealt 
with at the enterprise level in a very abstract manner. The original hypothesis that the 
enterprise level would be the level to address interoperability was incorrect. Multiple 
views must be used to address interoperability policy because issues of interoperability do 
not tend to surface until you get down to the lower levels. At the conclusion of the case 
study, it was realized that the system must be viewed down at the technology and 
engineering levels to make any firm conclusions regarding interoperability. 
Interoperability policy can still be implemented at the enterprise level though 
because it can be made explicit in the policy and requirements that interoperability is 
required at certain levels within and between various components. Viewpoints actually 
help to decompose the problem into manageable pieces at each level. The members of 
the development team, each with different roles, are able to view the system at various 
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levels of abstraction. A systems analyst would not be working at the engineering level 
but at a higher level in the hierarchy of views. The engineering level is concerned with 
hardware platforms and how they interoperate. Viewpoints support the division of labor 
and the idea of hierarchy of tasks. 
The viewpoints framework can aid in detecting and managing any inconsistencies 
that may arise in the requirements and specifications of each of the BMD systems. In the 
BMD system, the BWC4I system will link the subsystems to each other to support a 
multi-tiered, highly effective, interoperable BMD architecture. 
Inconsistencies provide clues about missing information. A reason for dealing 
with inconsistencies is to provide a more robust specification. Viewpoints can be used as 
the cornerstone of effective inconsistency management. 
The main goal in applying RM-ODP during system development is to detect as 
many conflicts as possible at the time of specification, rather than leaving them to be 
detected at runtime. Conflicts that are not detected until runtime can endanger the lives 
of the military and many civilians. The developers can modlfy the policies to remove 
conflicts in requirements and specifications. 
Viewpoints will help determine where interoperability is necessary and sufficient, 
and where interoperability should ,be optional or does not make sense. Interoperability in 
some systems may only be at the communications level where you are passing data back 
and forth to respond to a threat and each system goes about addressing that threat 





RM-ODP can be used to help us address these issues. It brings out the fact that 
we need interoperability. One system may use a certain type of radio for 
communications. At the technical level we may discover that we have two different types 
of radios that are not compatible. What would that tell you? You may need to rethink 
your system and go back up to a higher level where your requirements may state that you 
must use interoperable communications, and then as we come back down we may see the 
discrepancies. 
B. FUTUREWORK 
It is important to realize that RM-ODP is a framework that pennits us to focus on 
different viewpoints of a system. The case study showed how the viewpoints could be 
applied at a very abstract level and how RM-ODP may be useful for DoD in developing 
distributed systems. Future research topics could include the detailed application of the 
enterprise, information, computational, engineering, and technology viewpoints to other 
information systems being developed. Each of the five viewpoints could also be 
individually expanded on to model different development views of the system. The area 
of transformations between the different levels of viewpoints and consistency could be 
also explored. When transformations are made between different viewpoints, the 
developers need to ensure that the views are consistent. Consistency is a necessity 
between levels as well as across viewpoints. Another area of research could be the idea 
of viewpoint reuse. An important feature of RM-ODP is that the viewpoints can be 
reused at the various levels of abstraction. 
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